That “Cunning Fox” Trump

There are many adjectives—often unflattering—used to describe Donald Trump’s personality. I leave the choice to the reader. One point, however, is difficult to deny: to have been elected a second time, he displayed undeniable tactical skill. He was cunning like a fox. Yet being cunning does not necessarily mean being intelligent in the strategic and systemic sense.

With his marked egocentrism, Trump managed to galvanize support around simple but powerful slogans. The motto “MAGA” – Make America Great Again – captured a widespread sense of dissatisfaction. From a strictly economic standpoint, however, the United States is not a country in decline.

That said, structural imbalances remain evident.

The U.S. trade balance in goods and services continues to show a persistent deficit. In 2024 the overall trade deficit approached 926 billion dollars, confirming a long-standing structural imbalance in trade relations with the rest of the world. Monthly data in late 2025 still show significant negative figures, with deficits measured in tens of billions of dollars. The United States exports highly competitive services, yet imports substantially more goods than it exports, generating a chronic trade gap.

The current account balance—within the broader balance of payments—also reflects this imbalance. The United States continues to record a sizeable current account deficit, exceeding one trillion dollars in 2024. In practical terms, this means the country absorbs more foreign capital—through debt, portfolio investment, and direct investment—than it exports in goods, services, and income flows. The American economy remains attractive to global capital, but structurally dependent on it.

In this context, Trump spoke effectively to the “gut instinct” of a dissatisfied segment of the electorate: I will make you richer; we will no longer be exploited; I will stop unfair competition from illegal foreign workers. It was an effective communication strategy—but governing requires more than rhetoric. It requires the support of financial and economic power structures.

As previously noted, Trump gave voice to economists with a distinctly mercantilist orientation, advocating an economic strategy built around three core objectives:

1. Reducing the trade deficit through tariffs and protectionist measures;

2. Improving the balance of payments by attracting capital inflows;

3. Reorganizing the administrative apparatus to reduce public spending and contain welfare costs.

The policy instruments are familiar: raising or introducing new tariffs, strengthening domestic profitability through tax cuts for corporations, and streamlining bureaucracy to reduce fiscal burdens. It is a nationalistic and protectionist economic vision: produce more domestically, attract foreign capital, and reinforce internal growth.

However, such an ambitious domestic agenda requires a key precondition: the ability to disengage from external commitments and concentrate political and financial resources at home. And here the distinction between tactical cunning and strategic intelligence becomes decisive.

The United States remains the world’s leading economic and military power. Trump may have assumed that these primacies were sufficient to impose conditions internationally—using force when necessary, offering financial incentives when convenient, “buying” stability in order to disengage. But the world is no longer structured around the rigid bipolar balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is now multipolar, with actors such as China, the European Union, and emerging regional powers seeking to redefine global balances.

In this evolving system, Trump has become—perhaps inadvertently—the pivot of a historical door that may open in two opposite directions: toward a more balanced redistribution of international power, or toward deeper instability.

A third possibility also exists: that his leadership could erode from within if those who supported him judge the economic and political costs of his strategy too high.

The most fragile point remains the management of geopolitical conflicts—such as the Russian-Ukrainian war—which cannot be resolved solely through economic incentives. Wars involve identity, memory, and strategic positioning that go far beyond transactional calculations.

Geopolitics has thus become central—perhaps predominant—in Trump’s broader strategy. While domestic power can be exercised with relative concentration, international action is constrained by counterbalances, alliances, and competing interests.

In conclusion, the president’s personality remains a variable of uncertainty. An impulsive decision could produce unpredictable consequences. Conversely, a strategic retreat might be perceived as weakness, undermining investor confidence.

After all, who invests in a country perceived as politically unstable?

We are likely to witness years of profound transformation.
One can only hope that rational calculation prevails over improvisation.